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Overview
| Comment: | Better implementation of file_access() for win32: The function _waccess cannot handle long paths, and lies too much (e.g. when handling specific smb drives). Implementation borrowed from Tcl 8.6: http://core.tcl.tk/tcl/artifact/c6b5d4f8d7?ln=1510-1756 |
|---|---|
| Timelines: | family | ancestors | descendants | both | trunk |
| Files: | files | file ages | folders |
| SHA1: |
0b0eb52c07065e18d6c1591861746e0a |
| User & Date: | jan.nijtmans 2013-12-13 13:05:03.922 |
Context
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2013-12-13
| ||
| 13:48 | Better use GetCurrentDirectoryW in stead of _wgetcwd. check-in: 4e463bf7ba user: jan.nijtmans tags: trunk | |
| 13:05 | Better implementation of file_access() for win32: The function _waccess cannot handle long paths, and lies too much (e.g. when handling specific smb drives). Implementation borrowed from Tcl 8.6: http://core.tcl.tk/tcl/artifact/c6b5d4f8d7?ln=1510-1756 check-in: 0b0eb52c07 user: jan.nijtmans tags: trunk | |
| 12:26 | If the "Branching" checkbox is unchecked, the "Branch Closure" label should return to its original branchname. Add a javascript handler doing exactly that. check-in: 2cb54f3981 user: jan.nijtmans tags: trunk | |
Changes
Changes to src/file.c.
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316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 |
/*
** Wrapper around the access() system call.
*/
int file_access(const char *zFilename, int flags){
#ifdef _WIN32
wchar_t *zMbcs = fossil_utf8_to_filename(zFilename);
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/*
** Wrapper around the access() system call.
*/
int file_access(const char *zFilename, int flags){
#ifdef _WIN32
SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *sdPtr = NULL;
unsigned long size;
PSID pSid = 0;
BOOL SidDefaulted;
SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY samba_unmapped = {{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 22}};
GENERIC_MAPPING genMap;
HANDLE hToken = NULL;
DWORD desiredAccess = 0, grantedAccess = 0;
BOOL accessYesNo = FALSE;
PRIVILEGE_SET privSet;
DWORD privSetSize = sizeof(PRIVILEGE_SET);
int rc = 0;
DWORD attr;
wchar_t *zMbcs = fossil_utf8_to_filename(zFilename);
attr = GetFileAttributesW(zMbcs);
if( attr==INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES ){
/*
* File might not exist.
*/
if( GetLastError()!=ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION ){
fossil_filename_free(zMbcs);
return -1;
}
}
if( flags==F_OK ){
/*
* File exists, nothing else to check.
*/
fossil_filename_free(zMbcs);
return 0;
}
if( (flags & W_OK)
&& (attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY)
&& !(attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) ){
/*
* The attributes say the file is not writable. If the file is a
* regular file (i.e., not a directory), then the file is not
* writable, full stop. For directories, the read-only bit is
* (mostly) ignored by Windows, so we can't ascertain anything about
* directory access from the attrib data. However, if we have the
* advanced 'getFileSecurityProc', then more robust ACL checks
* will be done below.
*/
fossil_filename_free(zMbcs);
return -1;
}
/*
* It looks as if the permissions are ok, but if we are on NT, 2000 or XP,
* we have a more complex permissions structure so we try to check that.
* The code below is remarkably complex for such a simple thing as finding
* what permissions the OS has set for a file.
*/
/*
* First find out how big the buffer needs to be.
*/
size = 0;
GetFileSecurityW(zMbcs,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION
| DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | LABEL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
0, 0, &size);
/*
* Should have failed with ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER
*/
if( GetLastError()!=ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER ){
/*
* Most likely case is ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, which we will convert
* to EACCES - just what we want!
*/
fossil_filename_free(zMbcs);
return -1;
}
/*
* Now size contains the size of buffer needed.
*/
sdPtr = (SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR *) HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, size);
if( sdPtr == NULL ){
goto accessError;
}
/*
* Call GetFileSecurity() for real.
*/
if( !GetFileSecurityW(zMbcs,
OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION
| DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION | LABEL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
sdPtr, size, &size) ){
/*
* Error getting owner SD
*/
goto accessError;
}
/*
* As of Samba 3.0.23 (10-Jul-2006), unmapped users and groups are
* assigned to SID domains S-1-22-1 and S-1-22-2, where "22" is the
* top-level authority. If the file owner and group is unmapped then
* the ACL access check below will only test against world access,
* which is likely to be more restrictive than the actual access
* restrictions. Since the ACL tests are more likely wrong than
* right, skip them. Moreover, the unix owner access permissions are
* usually mapped to the Windows attributes, so if the user is the
* file owner then the attrib checks above are correct (as far as they
* go).
*/
if( !GetSecurityDescriptorOwner(sdPtr,&pSid,&SidDefaulted) ||
memcmp(GetSidIdentifierAuthority(pSid),&samba_unmapped,
sizeof(SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY))==0 ){
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, sdPtr);
fossil_filename_free(zMbcs);
return 0; /* Attrib tests say access allowed. */
}
/*
* Perform security impersonation of the user and open the resulting
* thread token.
*/
if( !ImpersonateSelf(SecurityImpersonation) ){
/*
* Unable to perform security impersonation.
*/
goto accessError;
}
if( !OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(),
TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_QUERY, FALSE, &hToken) ){
/*
* Unable to get current thread's token.
*/
goto accessError;
}
RevertToSelf();
/*
* Setup desiredAccess according to the access priveleges we are
* checking.
*/
if( flags & R_OK ){
desiredAccess |= FILE_GENERIC_READ;
}
if( flags & W_OK){
desiredAccess |= FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
}
memset(&genMap, 0x0, sizeof(GENERIC_MAPPING));
genMap.GenericRead = FILE_GENERIC_READ;
genMap.GenericWrite = FILE_GENERIC_WRITE;
genMap.GenericExecute = FILE_GENERIC_EXECUTE;
genMap.GenericAll = FILE_ALL_ACCESS;
/*
* Perform access check using the token.
*/
if( !AccessCheck(sdPtr, hToken, desiredAccess,
&genMap, &privSet, &privSetSize, &grantedAccess,
&accessYesNo) ){
/*
* Unable to perform access check.
*/
accessError:
if( sdPtr != NULL ){
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, sdPtr);
}
if( hToken != NULL ){
CloseHandle(hToken);
}
fossil_filename_free(zMbcs);
return -1;
}
/*
* Clean up.
*/
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, sdPtr);
CloseHandle(hToken);
if( !accessYesNo ){
rc = -1;
}
#else
char *zMbcs = fossil_utf8_to_filename(zFilename);
int rc = access(zMbcs, flags);
#endif
fossil_filename_free(zMbcs);
return rc;
}
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