PuTTy: Diff

Differences From Artifact [a5ff560ba3]:

File ssh.c — part of check-in [92e8b2cec5] at 2002-10-25 06:30:33 on branch trunk — Major destabilisation, phase 2. This time it's the backends' turn: each backend now stores all its internal variables in a big struct, and each backend function gets a pointer to this struct passed to it. This still isn't the end of the work - lots of subsidiary things still use globals, notably all the cipher and compressor modules and the X11 forwarding authentication stuff. But ssh.c itself has now been transformed, and that was the really painful bit, so from here on it all ought to be a sequence of much smaller and simpler pieces of work. (user: simon size: 180700)

To Artifact [235ccc10ea]:

File ssh.c — part of check-in [f12024de9a] at 2002-10-25 07:35:22 on branch trunk — SSH ciphers now use dynamically allocated contexts. (user: simon size: 181762)

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546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560	546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562	+ +	int v1_compressing; int v1_remote_protoflags; int v1_local_protoflags; int agentfwd_enabled; int X11_fwd_enabled; int remote_bugs; const struct ssh_cipher cipher; void v1_cipher_ctx; const struct ssh2_cipher cscipher, sccipher; void cs_cipher_ctx, sc_cipher_ctx; const struct ssh_mac csmac, scmac; const struct ssh_compress cscomp, sccomp; const struct ssh_kex kex; const struct ssh_signkey hostkey; unsigned char v2_session_id[20]; char *savedhost;
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799 800 801 802 803 804 805 ~~806~~ 807 808 809 810 811 812 813	801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815	- +	if (ssh->cipher && detect_attack(ssh->pktin.data, st->biglen, NULL)) { bombout(("Network attack (CRC compensation) detected!")); crReturn(0); } if (ssh->cipher) ~~ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->pktin.data, st->biglen);~~ ssh->cipher->decrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->pktin.data, st->biglen); st->realcrc = crc32(ssh->pktin.data, st->biglen - 4); st->gotcrc = GET_32BIT(ssh->pktin.data + st->biglen - 4); if (st->gotcrc != st->realcrc) { bombout(("Incorrect CRC received on packet")); crReturn(0); }
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913 914 915 916 917 918 919 ~~920~~ 921 922 923 924 925 926 927	915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930	- + +	while ((datalen) == 0) crReturn(st->cipherblk - st->i); ssh->pktin.data[st->i] = (data)++; (datalen)--; } if (ssh->sccipher) ~~ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->~~pktin.data, st->~~cipher~~blk);~~~~ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, ssh->pktin.data, st->cipherblk); /* * Now get the length and padding figures. */ st->len = GET_32BIT(ssh->pktin.data); st->pad = ssh->pktin.data[4];
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964 965 966 967 968 969 970 ~~971~~ 972 973 974 975 976 977 978	967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982	- + +	while ((datalen) == 0) crReturn(st->packetlen + st->maclen - st->i); ssh->pktin.data[st->i] = (data)++; (datalen)--; } /* Decrypt everything _except_ the MAC. / if (ssh->sccipher) ~~ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->~~pktin.data + st->~~cipher~~blk~~,~~ ssh->sccipher->decrypt(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, ssh->pktin.data + st->cipherblk, st->packetlen - st->cipherblk); / * Check the MAC. */ if (ssh->scmac && !ssh->scmac->verify(ssh->pktin.data, st->len + 4,
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1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 ~~1175~~ 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182	1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186	- +	for (i = 0; i < pad; i++) ssh->pktout.data[i + 4] = random_byte(); crc = crc32(ssh->pktout.data + 4, biglen - 4); PUT_32BIT(ssh->pktout.data + biglen, crc); PUT_32BIT(ssh->pktout.data, len); if (ssh->cipher) ~~ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->pktout.data + 4, biglen);~~ ssh->cipher->encrypt(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->pktout.data + 4, biglen); return biglen + 4; } static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh) { int len, backlog;
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1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 ~~1472~~ 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479	1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484	+ - +	PUT_32BIT(ssh->pktout.data, ssh->pktout.length + padding - 4); if (ssh->csmac) ssh->csmac->generate(ssh->pktout.data, ssh->pktout.length + padding, ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence); ssh->v2_outgoing_sequence++; /* whether or not we MACed / if (ssh->cscipher) ssh->cscipher->encrypt(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, ~~~~ssh->cscipher->encrypt(~~ssh->pktout.data, ssh->pktout.length + padding);~~ ssh->pktout.data, ssh->pktout.length + padding); / Ready-to-send packet starts at ssh->pktout.data. We return length. / return ssh->pktout.length + padding + maclen; } / * Construct and send an SSH2 packet immediately.
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2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 ~~2356~~ 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363	2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 2371 2372 2373 2374	+ - + + + + + +	logevent("Trying to enable encryption..."); sfree(s->rsabuf); ssh->cipher = (s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH ? &ssh_blowfish_ssh1 : s->cipher_type == SSH_CIPHER_DES ? &ssh_des : &ssh_3des); ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = ssh->cipher->make_context(); ~~ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->session_key);~~ ssh->cipher->sesskey(ssh->v1_cipher_ctx, ssh->session_key); { char buf[256]; sprintf(buf, "Initialised %.200s encryption", ssh->cipher->text_name); logevent(buf); } crWaitUntil(ispkt); if (ssh->pktin.type != SSH1_SMSG_SUCCESS) { bombout(("Encryption not successfully enabled")); crReturn(0); }
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4012 4013 4014 4015 4016 4017 4018 4019 4020 4021 4022 4023 4024 4025 4026 4027 4028 4029 4030 4031 4032 4033 4034 4035 4036 ~~4037~~ 4038 ~~4039~~ 4040 ~~4041~~ 4042 ~~4043~~ 4044 4045 4046 4047 4048 4049 4050 4051 4052 4053 4054 4055	4023 4024 4025 4026 4027 4028 4029 4030 4031 4032 4033 4034 4035 4036 4037 4038 4039 4040 4041 4042 4043 4044 4045 4046 4047 4048 4049 4050 4051 4052 4053 4054 4055 4056 4057 4058 4059 4060 4061 4062 4063 4064 4065 4066 4067 4068 4069 4070 4071 4072 4073 4074 4075 4076 4077 4078 4079 4080 4081 4082	+ + + + + + - + - + - + - + + + + + + + + + + +	bombout(("expected new-keys packet from server")); crReturn(0); } /* * Create and initialise session keys. / if (ssh->cs_cipher_ctx) ssh->cscipher->free_context(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx); ssh->cscipher = s->cscipher_tobe; ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = ssh->cscipher->make_context(); if (ssh->sc_cipher_ctx) ssh->sccipher->free_context(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx); ssh->sccipher = s->sccipher_tobe; ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = ssh->sccipher->make_context(); ssh->csmac = s->csmac_tobe; ssh->scmac = s->scmac_tobe; ssh->cscomp = s->cscomp_tobe; ssh->sccomp = s->sccomp_tobe; ssh->cscomp->compress_init(); ssh->sccomp->decompress_init(); / * Set IVs after keys. Here we use the exchange hash from the * _first_ key exchange. / { unsigned char keyspace[40]; if (s->first_kex) memcpy(ssh->v2_session_id, s->exchange_hash, sizeof(s->exchange_hash)); ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'C',keyspace); ~~ssh->cscipher->setcskey(keyspace);~~ ssh->cscipher->setkey(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace); ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'D',keyspace); ~~ssh->sccipher->setsckey(keyspace);~~ ssh->sccipher->setkey(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace); ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'A',keyspace); ~~ssh->cscipher->set~~csiv(~~keyspace);~~ ssh->cscipher->setiv(ssh->cs_cipher_ctx, keyspace); ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'B',keyspace); ~~ssh->sccipher->set~~sciv(~~keyspace);~~ ssh->sccipher->setiv(ssh->sc_cipher_ctx, keyspace); ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'E',keyspace); ssh->csmac->setcskey(keyspace); ssh2_mkkey(ssh,s->K,s->exchange_hash,ssh->v2_session_id,'F',keyspace); ssh->scmac->setsckey(keyspace); } { char buf[256]; sprintf(buf, "Initialised %.200s client->server encryption", ssh->cscipher->text_name); logevent(buf); sprintf(buf, "Initialised %.200s server->client encryption", ssh->sccipher->text_name); logevent(buf); } / * If this is the first key exchange phase, we must pass the * SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS packet to the next layer, not because it * wants to see it but because it will need time to initialise * itself before it sees an actual packet. In subsequent key * exchange phases, we don't pass SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS on, because
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5748 5749 5750 5751 5752 5753 5754 5755 5756 5757 5758 5759 5760 5761 5762 5763	5775 5776 5777 5778 5779 5780 5781 5782 5783 5784 5785 5786 5787 5788 5789 5790 5791 5792 5793	+ + +	{ char p; Ssh ssh; ssh = smalloc(sizeof(ssh)); ssh->s = NULL; ssh->cipher = NULL; ssh->v1_cipher_ctx = NULL; ssh->cscipher = NULL; ssh->cs_cipher_ctx = NULL; ssh->sccipher = NULL; ssh->sc_cipher_ctx = NULL; ssh->csmac = NULL; ssh->scmac = NULL; ssh->cscomp = NULL; ssh->sccomp = NULL; ssh->kex = NULL; ssh->hostkey = NULL; ssh->exitcode = -1;
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